Our work provides an analysis of the interaction effects between internal governance mechanisms on the components of initial returns during the listing period. The application of multivariate regressions on a sample of 110 IPO French companies during 2005-2010, has allowed us to conclude that the different interactions between these mechanisms significantly influence the level of under / overpricing. Indeed, the positive relationship between internal governance mechanisms and overpricing reflects a substitutability relationship. In contrast, the complementarity effect comes from the negative relationship characterizing the combination of governance mechanisms and the underpricing. Thus, the interactions effects between institutional ownership, board structure and under / overpricing are not conforming to the existence of a complementarity or substitutability relationship between these variables given the absence of a significant combination between these variables.
Introduction
The agency theory considers the financial market as a means to strengthen the arsenal of control agents, encouraging them to make strategic decisions that create value. According to the agency theory, a complementary relationship, in terms of control may exist between the board and ownership structure. Charreaux Pitol & Belin (1990) argue that the role of the board changes with the ownership structure, and its disciplinary function becomes secondary in family firms or controlled primarily by shareholders. Thus, governance mechanisms within IPO firms occur in response to agency conflicts between owners and managers having conflicts arise from the dilution. The interaction between these mechanisms determines the effectiveness of the governance structure of a firm and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ).
Although the study of the interactions between the different governance mechanisms is raised by various studies in different contexts, our work differs from other research on several fronts. The first contribution of this paper is to examine the phenomena associated with an IPO in the French context. Indeed, we opted for a methodology identical to that of Gao (2010) to verify the existence of the under / overpricing during the IPO. In other words, we first determine the components of the initial returns observed at the IPO.
Another contribution is to check whether the combination of internal governance mechanisms has an effect on the under/overpricing. Indeed, very few studies have focused on exploring the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and initial returns components in the French context. Thus, our work aims at understanding how the joints (complementarity / substitutability) between existing internal governance mechanisms can influence the under / overpricing. In this context, the study of these joints allows companies to avoid duplication of control and increase shareholder wealth (Fernandez & Arrondo, 2005) . This article will be divided into three parts. The theoretical framework and research hypotheses to be tested cover the first part. The second part deals with methodological aspects. The third part presents the analysis and discussion of results.
Context of the study and hypothesis of research

Interaction effects between ownership structure and board independence on the under/overpricing
The IPO process leads to a loss of control held by the original shareholders, as it would sell an important block of shares. The result is a transfer of wealth of the original shareholders in favor of new investors. Miloud (2003) asserts that, before the initial public offering, the ownership is, generally, concentrated in the hands of the founding shareholder or the partners of origin. As a consequence to the new subscriptions which the company receives, the structure of ownership becomes more scattered after the listing period, especially when these partners choose to partially or completely divest the company, which leads to a transformation of the ownership of those who do not want to have their company controlled by new investors. Hill (2006) , and Roosenboom Schramade (2006), Wang (2005) show that ownership structure and ownership concentration affect significantly the degree of underpricing, especially in emerging markets. According to Lee (2004) , dominant shareholders can directly and easily control the manager, leading to a decrease in agency costs caused by the opportunism of professional manager. However, the discretionary powers can be exercised by the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. This may encourage the IPO firm to opt for some form of oversight by independent directors in order to reduce information asymmetry, and to protect the interests of small shareholders. Indeed, to provide oversight by outside directors may be particularly useful in the context of an IPO, where the increased complexity of management positions (due to competition and market pressures on IPO companies) and the proliferation of potential strategies (due to uncertainty in the sector) make these companies a fertile ground for managerial incompetence and / or problems of opportunism (Kor et al (2008) ). This can influence the under / overpricing characterizing the IPO. Therefore, our hypothesis is the following:
H1: the effect of ownership concentration on the under/ overpricing varies with board independence. Accordingly, monitoring by external directors may be more common during the IPO where there is a greater incentive to monitor managerial decisions. Indeed, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) stipulates an increase of agency costs during the listing period. Because of the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders, Jensen (1986) suggests that managers prefer to invest the funds raised during the IPO and the cash flows in unprofitable projects at the expense of shareholder wealth. Therefore, the assumption of agency cost is considered as a possible explanation for the evolution of initial returns of IPO firms. Indeed, the proportion of the capital held by insiders may much explain the underpricing and the overpricing given that they do not have too much interest to underprice their shares for not having huge losses and have interest to attribute overpriced shares to misinformed investors. Hence, the involvement of independent directors during the IPO period is necessary because the IPO environment is characterized by high levels of information asymmetry leading, therefore, to appearance of agency problems that require important monitoring of management decisions within the firm. Actually, the information asymmetry that characterizes the IPO context can be reduced if the independent directors constitute a specific data source after interaction with leaders of IPO firms. This gives them access to public and private information of the firm (Carpenter and Weestphal (2001) ). Their presence may thus have an effect on the underpricing which is, in turn, an increasing function of information asymmetry during the IPO. We can, as a result, establish the following hypothesis:
H2: The interaction effect between managerial ownership and board independence can influence the level of under / overpricing. In addition, information asymmetry characterizing IPOs can be reduced by the presence of institutional investors. Indeed, Barry et al [1990] and Megginson & Weiss [1991] suggest that the presence of venture capitalists weakens the level of information asymmetry between issuers and investors. Generally, the presence of institutional owners is considered a signal of credibility for a newly-listed public company.
This signal provides valuable information on the economy for investors and industry partners, when it is difficult to predict the financial stability and future success of entrepreneurial firms, mainly when operating in unstable environments (Kor and al (2008) ). Kor and al (2008) ) also argue that investors can better understand the perspectives of IPO firms as they participate regularly in IPOs. Therefore, we can expect that: H3: The complementary effect existing between board independence and institutional ownership can affect performance during the listing period.
Interaction effects between ownership structure and CEO duality on the under/overpricing
Although it has been the most abundant literature, board independence, apprehended through the nature of its internal or external members, is not the only engine of its efficiency. Board structure is, indeed, a major reflection on corporate governance. The effectiveness of the board structure is probably has an impact on value creation. Thus, the board may have a monistic board structure, that is to say, an accumulation of the position of President and Chief Executive Officer, or a dual structure that takes the form of the Supervisory Board and Executive Board. The latter is characterized by the separation between the functions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (Boutillier, M., Labye, A., Lagoutte, C., Levy, N., and Oheix. V., (2002)). Several studies suggest that a single person should not hold simultaneously the role of chairman and CEO. In fact, combining the functions is at first sight the crossroads of conflicts of interest (Zahra and Pearce (1989) ), resulting in agency costs increase during the IPO. Consequently, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) stipulates an increase of agency costs at the IPO. Hochberg (2004) shows that agency costs are also important for an IPO company thanks to the dilution of capital and the greater separation of ownership and control. Therefore, it is interesting to have a concentrated ownership before IPO to reduce agency conflicts and eventually the agency costs. Indeed, Shleifer & Vishny (1986) , Agrawal & Mandelker (1990) and Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) show that the more ownership is concentrated, the more leaders are better controlled and the more the company is profitable. Indeed, shareholders holding a significant part of capital may force leaders to work in their favor by opposing their decisions when they go against the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. Our hypothesis is as follows: H4: The complementarity or substitutability effect between concentration of ownership and duality can influence the under/overpricing.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) , a monistic board structure indicates a potential managerial opportunism. We find that the new investors have no incentive to participate in the capital of IPO firm whose structure of the board is monistic. Indeed, managerial control would be threatened as long as the person performing the two functions, as chairman of the board, becomes more aligned with the direction than with the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1983) ). Based on a sample of firms in Great Britain, Dahya et al (1996) found that, when companies move from a structure of separation of functions to a structure of accumulation, the stock market reacts unfavorably. Conscious of the negative effect that the combine of functions can exercise on the performance of the firm, potential investors may require a high level of underpricing when they want to subscribe for new issues (Juan (2007) ). Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H5: The combination between duality and managerial ownership may affect the performance observed during the IPO.
Institutional investors have common requirements among firms in which they are shareholders. Their fame and reputation can increase their power over managers and force them to follow their recommendations, even if they individually have a small part of capital (Plihon D. and Ponssard JP, (2002) ). This may create conflicts of interest between managers and institutional owners of the company whose structure of the board is monistic and also able to influence the underpricing during the listing period. Therefore: we can make the following hypothesis:
H6: the effect of institutional ownership on the under / overpricing varies with duality.
1.3
Interaction effects between ownership structure and board size on the under/overpricing For agency theorists, the size of the Board promotes high dominance of the leader by raising coalitions and group conflicts ). The result is the existence of boards which have difficulty operating efficiently in reaching consensus on important decisions (Herman (1981) ). In contrast, Pearce and Zahra (1992) show that a large board strengthens its capacity to monitor and improves its informational sources. With its diversified structure, a board composed of a large number of directors provides better environmental links and demonstrates greater expertise. This control within the board of a large size can be strengthened in the presence of concentrated capital used to reduce agency costs characterizing the IPO process. Certo et al (2001) find a negative and significant relationship between IPO underpricing and the size of the board of directors. Indeed, a large board size reduces the uncertainty of the value of the company. A reduction of the asymmetry of information is to be observed, leading to a subsequent low IPO underpricing during a new initial public offering. We can predict the following hypothesis:
H7: The effect of ownership concentration on the under/overpricing varies with the size of the board.
The study of Yermack (1996) shows that the large board can hide entrenchment mechanisms. This means that the probability of encountering boards of large size must be even more important than the domination of leaders in the board. Moreover, the author reveals that wages and the threat of removal of managers are higher in companies with boards characterizing by a small number of administrators. This may lead us to predict a relationship of complementarity or substitutability between managerial ownership and board size, which makes us come up with the following hypothesis:
H8: the combination of managerial ownership and board size can affect the under / overpricing during the listing period.
High uncertainty and information asymmetry characterizing the IPO period require the presence of institutional investors. As a matter of fact, their presence within the IPO company reduces the asymmetry of information thereby creating an inverse relationship between the underpricing and the part of capital held by the investors. These can add significant value to the company by a positive signal that manifests itself by better supervision on the board of directors. It follows then that the pressure from institutional investors to empower administrators may also be responsible for the decrease in board size (Wu (2000) ). In this regard, we can establish the following hypothesis:
H9: There is a relationship of complementarity or substitutability between board size and institutional ownership influencing the initial returns at the IPO.
Methodology
Sampling
Our study concerns a sample of 110 French companies listed on the Stock Exchange, between 2005-2010. This sample was obtained from the site of Euronext (www.euronext.com).
We removed certain observations of our sample as far as the logic of transfer of markets or the private placement does not correspond to that of the first initial public offering. 
Equations of the model to be studied and description of variables
Presentation of the model
By referring to the study of Gao (2010), we can formulate the idea according to which the initial return includes elements of under / overpricing. Thus, the initial return can be influenced by different governance mechanisms given that the impact of the governance structure on the IPO underpricing has been the subject of several previous studies. However, the nature of the relationship between governance structure and IPO overpricing has not yet been studied. Consequently, the interaction effects between internal governance mechanisms may have important implications for determining the initial return and particularly the level of under/overpricing.
To examine the interactions between internal governance mechanisms and their impact on the components of the initial returns, we found advisable to opt for the multivariate regression analysis: 
Defining and Measuring Variables
The measures adopted to study the impact of interactions between internal governance mechanisms on the level of under/overpricing are presented in the following table.
3 Description and analysis of the results
Determination of the intrinsic value
Concerning our study, the intrinsic value is obtained by a linear regression while considering the market price and the listing price, of all the new issues, between 2005-2010.
Table 2. Definitions of variables in our model
Variables Definitions
Explanatory variables of the under/overpricing Ownership Concentration
This is the percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholders (which is greater than or equal to 20% for each shareholder).
Managerial Ownership
The percentage of shares owned by managers and directors
Institutional Ownership
The percentage of shares held by institutional investors.
Board Independance
The percentage of independent (non affiliated) outside directors on a firm"s board (number of outside directors/board size)
CEO Duality
Dummy variable taking one if CEO is also the chairman of the board, and is 0 otherwise.
Board Size
The number of directors on a board for each firm Exchange of Paris, we succeeded to determine the intrinsic value of every listed share. The model, thus, spells as follows: IV i,t = a + ß MRi,t + e i,t It stands out from the following table, that the coefficients α and ß, are statistically significant (α is significant at the level of 1 % and ß at the level of 10 %).
Descriptive analysis
According to table 4 we can see that the offer price exceeds the market price, with a relatively high value on average. The intrinsic value obtained by linear regression, is greater than the offering price and the market price recorded during the IPO. This explains the negative mean value of under/overpricing. The analysis shows, therefore, that the offer price is, on average, closer to the intrinsic value, in comparison to the market price. This justifies the fact that the average value of the underpricing is higher compared to that observed at the overpricing. We note that the ownership structure is highly concentrated with an average of 94.54%. This implies that most of the major shareholders of the companies in our sample have a part of shares in excess of 20%. Indeed, we have decided to opt for the definition of La Porta et al (1999) to define our variable of ownership concentration. Indeed, a highly concentrated ownership implies that the main shareholders have a stock of shares equal to or greater than 20% of all shares representing the capital of the firm. A highly concentrated ownership implies that the minority of companies have widely dispersed ownership, in the sense that the major shareholder does not even have a part of shares equal to 20% of all shares constituting the capital of the firm. Shareholders-managers hold, on average, 47.51% of the shares of IPO company. This value is, relatively, large, with a median of 50% (49.45%). This implies that most managers hold a significant part of shares before the listing period, strengthening their managerial power within the firm. This implies, therefore, that the majority of these firms are family because property ownership is highly concentrated, and the managerial ownership is, on average, higher. This justifies the fact that over 50% of our sample are listed on Alternext, which is a market designed primarily for SMEs.
Similarly, we find that institutional ownership is, relatively, large with an average of 35.38%. Legal persons involved heavily in the capital of IPO company because of their important role in the control before and during the listing period in order to succeed the IPO. However, this does not preclude the existence of firms which the property ownership is held primarily and exclusively by individuals, in the sense that institutional ownership takes a minimum value (that is equal to 0). Board size takes a minimum value of 3 and a maximum value of 18. In addition, the low level of board independence may be due to the duality, since most companies have a monistic structure. This reinforces the idea that these companies are family and have no interest in separating the control from direction. Hence, the appointment of independent directors in these firms is reduced. This table shows that the coefficients of skewness are different from zero and positive, with the exception of those related to the concentration of ownership and duality. This implies that most of the distributions are skewed to the right. In contrast, distributions concerning the ownership concentration and the duality are spread to the left. Thus, the coefficients of kurtosis are strictly greater than 3, except those related to managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and duality. The distributions of these last three variables are platykurtique, that the kurtosis is less than 3. Distributions of other variables are leptokurtic, since the kurtosis is greater than 3.
Multivariate analysis
Correlation matrix between the independent variables
The problem of multicollinearity arises when two variables are highly correlated. Kervin (1992) states that a problem of multicollinearity is present when the correlation coefficient is greater than 7. Examination of the various correlation coefficients contained in the two tables shows that they are below the limits set by Kervin (1992) . This means the absence of a critical correlation that can present a serious problem of collinearity between the independent variables included in our regression model. These findings allow us to apply multivariate regressions without fear that there is a problem of multicollinearity between independent variables included in our model. 
Combination effects between ownership concentration and board characteristics on the under/overpricing
The significant and positive relationship between board independence and underpricing leads to the conclusion that the control provided by the independent directors does reduce neither the level of information asymmetry nor the agency costs characterizing the IPO nor the level of underpricing. That goes in the direction of reducing the level of the overpricing. Indeed, we can notice that the existence of independent directors on the board weakens the extent of overpricing. Juan (2007) predicted that the uncertainty from potential problems associated with the low board independence may motivate investors to seek higher underpricing. However, the result contradicts the research hypothesis insofar as an independent board is associated with a high level of underpricing, which may justify the negative and significant link between overpricing and board independence. In fact, a significant demand of underpricing on the part of investors is in line with a reduction of the level of overpricing for a firm whose board is independent. In contrast, the interaction between ownership concentration and board independence affects negatively the underpricing. This can be attributed to an effect of complementarity between the two variables used to reduce the level of underpricing observed during the listing period in an attempt to protect the interests of controlling shareholders selling part of their shares at the IPO. Put differently, the process of the IPO leads to a loss of control held by the original shareholders, as it would sell an important block of shares. The result is a transfer of wealth of the original shareholders in favor of new investors. Thus, the underpricing that involves a reduction in share value over the market price is in contradiction with the interests of controlling and original shareholders. On the other hand, informed external investors wishing to participate in the capital of the IPO firm may take advantage of this underpricing. Nevertheless, uninformed investors will benefit from overpriced shares of IPO companies. .63 *** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 0.10 level As has been observed, the common presence of dominant shareholders and independent directors can strengthen monitoring and encourage managers to act in the interests of the firm. Indeed, monitoring within a firm with concentrated ownership of capital and independent board reduces information asymmetry and agency cost bringing about a reduction in the level of the underpricing. This explains the inverse relationship between the combination of the two governance mechanisms and the underpricing.
We found that the common presence of dominant shareholders and independent directors affects the overpricing favorably. This means that there is a relationship of substitutability between the two internal governance mechanisms increasing the level of overpricing. It should be noted that this overpricing is a component of the initial return (according to Gao (2010) ) and can adversely affect the performance. In contrast, the underpricing improves the performance observed during the IPO. It is for this reason that the underpricing is a signal to potential investors reflecting the good quality of the issuing company as only good companies are able to recover the cost of this underpricing. Therefore, the overpricing discourages the prospective investors to subscribe to new shares. This is not beneficial to the company which strives to make its IPO succeed in order to attract investors in the stock market. Hence, the positive relationship between the internal mechanisms of governance and the overpricing reflects a relative substitutability between board independence and ownership concentration having a positive impact on the overpricing
Combination effects between managerial ownership and board characteristics on the under/overpricing
The observation of the table shows that Model 2 is significant, with a power of explanation of 97.51%. This means that variables strongly determine the level of the overpricing, compared to the underpricing. The results show that board size and managerial ownership positively and significantly influence the underpricing. However, there is a negative and significant relationship between duality, board size, managerial ownership and the overpricing. Indeed, a significant presence of insiders can increase the capacity of founding CEOs to negotiate the initial public offering price with investment banks, reflecting the assessments of their companies by the market during the first day of trading (Certo (2001) ), which can reduce the risk of observing a phenomenon of overpricing. It also implies that a large board with a monistic configuration and high managerial ownership before IPO does not reduce information asymmetry and agency costs by providing less effective control resulting in the appearance of conflicts of interest among stakeholders. 31.14 *** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 0.10 level Quite the contrary, the combination of managerial ownership and board size has a negative impact on the underpricing. This can go along with the idea of Yermack (1996) that shows that large boards can hide entrenchment mechanisms. This means that the probability of encountering the boards of large size in our sample of companies must be all the more important that the domination of the manager is accentuated. Indeed, the large part of managerial ownership within the board encourages them to not undervalue overmuch their shares for sale during the IPO for not realizing huge losses.
Thus, the decline in the level of underpricing is usually accompanied by an increase in the overpricing, given that this overpricing and underpricing represent the components of the initial returns, which justifies the positive relationship between the combination of the two mechanisms of governance (managerial ownership size of the board) and the overpricing.
Combination effects between institutional ownership and board characteristics on the under/overpricing
Observing the table, we can see that the internal governance mechanisms strongly influence the overpricing with an explanatory power of 96.49%. In contrast, the explanatory power of the Model 1 explaining the nature of the relationship between the internal governance mechanisms and the underpricing is 14.45%. This means that internal governance mechanisms strongly determine the level of overpricing compared to the underpricing.
The results allow us to see that a wide board whose structure is monistic and with a large number of independent directors influence positively the underpricing and negatively the overpricing at the IPO. Therefore, a board with these characteristics does not ensure effective control leading to reduce the level of the underpricing in order to protect the interest of the original shareholders who sold a portion of their capital during the IPO.
Our results reflect, to some extent, the ideas of Hermalin (2004) and Ginglinger (2002) , insofar as the large board is ineffective in exercising control of management. This reduces the opportunities to make decisions for the benefit of shareholders and enhances the discretion of management. The latter will, thereafter, act in their own interests by increasing the level of underpricing, to attract new investors, while ensuring that their managerial power is strengthened. 25.69 *** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 0.10 level Thus, an improvement in the underpricing is generally accompanied by a deterioration of the overpricing. The significant underpricing can be attributed to the high level of informational asymmetry resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers before the listing period. This causes an increase in the underpricing usually accompanied by a reduction in the overpricing. We note that the interaction between institutional ownership, board independence (inst.own*B.indep) , duality (inst.own*Duality) and under / overpricing do not provide significant results. The existence of a relationship of complementarity or substitutability between these variables is not consistent with the last result.
Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that the governance structure is a major determinant of initial returns observed during the IPO. Indeed, the application of multivariate regressions on a sample of 110 French companies during 2005-2010, has allowed us to assert that the different mechanisms of internal governance as well as the interactions between these mechanisms significantly influence the level of under / overpricing. We have found that most of the internal governance mechanisms affect positively and significantly the levels of underpricing and negatively the overvpricing. In contrast, the combination of these mechanisms creates an adverse effect on these phenomena observed at the IPO. In other words, most of the interactions between these governance mechanisms have a positive impact on the overpricing. In contrast, the underpricing is negatively and significantly influenced by the combination of these different mechanisms. Indeed, the positive relationship between internal governance mechanisms and overpricing reflects a substitutability relationship. In contrast, the complementarity effect comes from the negative relationship characterizing the combination of governance mechanisms and the underpricing. Thus, the interactions between institutional ownership, board independence, duality and under / overpricing are not statistically significant. This does not substantiate the existence of a complementarity or substitutability relationship between these variables.
